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Abstract 
The literature on European Union (EU) integration sees increasing liberalization as a 
major challenge for models of national capitalism within Member States. EU liberalization, it is 
argued, erodes national welfare regimes and prevents the re-embedding of markets in social 
protection systems.  However, other scholars highlight the ability of national institutions to 
reinvent themselves to offer social protection.  This paper assesses these claims by exploring an 
extreme case of labor market pressure driven by EU liberalization.  Employment conditions in 
the meat production sector in Germany and Denmark have been affected in very different ways 
by EU liberalization. We explore whether, and to what extent, low wage labor migration has 
weakened the position of social partners and the rules that shape the employment conditions in 
the industry.  We see evidence of deinstitutionalization in both Germany and Denmark but we 
 2 
 
also see evidence of distinct institutional reinvention that reflects national political traditions. We 
find that some degree of solidaristic labor market regulation can be maintained – at least in the 
short term – even in the face of relocation and job losses.  
 
Introduction 
The literature on European Union (EU) integration views increasing market liberalization 
as a major challenge for national models of capitalism within EU Member States.  Scholars argue 
that EU liberalization erodes national welfare regimes and prevents the re-embedding of markets 
in social protection systems. However, other scholars highlight the ability of national institutions 
to reinvent themselves to offer social protection.  This paper assesses these claims by exploring 
an extreme case of labor market pressure driven by EU liberalization.  Employment conditions in 
the meat production sector in Germany and Denmark have been affected in very different ways 
by EU reform.  While in 1996, slaughterhouse wages for union members in Denmark and 
Germany were roughly the same (Kristensen, Kristensen and Strandskov, 1996), wages have 
changed in opposite directions: they have continued to grow in Denmark to an average of about € 
34 per hour, whereas in Germany they have fallen to about half the Danish wage level, while 
subcontracted East European workers in Germany can make as little as € 1.50 per hour.  Danish 
meat producers have chosen to take advantage of the low German wages and have outsourced 
production to Germany resulting in a steep decline in meat production jobs in Denmark. 
These discrepancies in labor costs pose a major challenge for employment regimes and 
the welfare states in Germany and Denmark.  The 1993 establishment of the Single European 
Market and the free movement of workers has resulted in cheap labor migration from Eastern 
Europe into Germany.  How does low cost labor impact the position of social partners as the 
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cheap conditions of migrant work disseminates into the core workforce?  Are the social partners 
in Germany and Denmark able to negotiate new social protection schemes?  We find that the 
different employment regimes fuel a process of institutional arbitrage that in turn leads to an 
increasing relocation of jobs to Member States where highly dualized labor practices allow for 
very low labor costs.  However, it is possible to adopt some degree of solidaristic labor market 
regulation even in the face of relocation and job losses.  In Germany this includes the adoption of 
a minimum wage. In Denmark the social partners have traditionally been able to negotiate high 
wages for all workers although recently the union has agreed to take a pay cut in return for 
saving production in Denmark and investment to ensure upgrading and expansion of production. 
However, the real advantage of the Danish model may be its ability to ensure the re-
employability of meat production workers who have lost their jobs to outsourcing.  
Labor market liberalization in the EU is established through the Freedom of 
Establishment and Freedom of Movement Principles that guarantee all EU citizens the right to 
set up a business and work in other countries on the basis of the hosting Member State’s labor 
laws.  In addition, the EU has institutionalized a circular migration regime through the Posted 
Workers Directive, which allows for the posting of employees, hired in one Member State to 
work in another Member State, with the social protection and wages of the sending country, 
unless specifically regulated by the destination country. These instruments have facilitated and 
encouraged a pattern of labor migration and introduced vastly different wages for migrant 
workers into the high wage countries of Western Europe. Posted workers, by definition, are 
located in the secondary labor market. They do not migrate to the host countries but remain 
economically, as well as legally, rooted in their home countries.  Finally, labor migration in the 
EU takes place in an economic context, which is characterized by high earnings differentials. 
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According to Eurostat, the average gross annual earnings among EU Member States ranged in 
2011 from € 60,000 in Denmark to € 4,600 in Bulgaria. The huge wage discrepancy gives 
companies a great incentive to recruit migrant workers for low wages.  
We proceed as follows:  We start by situating our paper in a theoretical debate about 
market integration and the role of labor standards in the EU that emphasizes either 
‘deinstitutionalization’ or ‘institutional adjustment’. In Part II we present our methodology. Part 
III is a case study of the use of migrant workers in the German meat industry as well as a case 
study of the outsourcing of meat production from Denmark to Germany in order to take 
advantage of the cheaper German wages. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the implications 
of our findings for the future of the European labor market.  
 
I Theoretical approaches: Deinstitutionalization or Institutional Adjustment in 
Organized capitalism in an integrated Europe  
The theoretical debate on the interplay between supranational institutions fostering EU-
integration and national Member States is characterized by two different and opposing 
perspectives: According to one perspective, given the variety of existing capitalisms within the 
EU, European integration increasingly results in a “clash of capitalisms”, as policies aimed at 
fostering integration create a scenario in which supranational actors and institutions, such as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ),  push for liberalization and expand their areas of action and 
responsibility thereby eroding national welfare state traditions (Höpner & Schäfer, 2007). 
According to these authors, the process of European integration can be subdivided into 
three phases: first, the Customs Union, second, a phase characterized by the introduction of the 
principle of mutual recognition and the central role of European actors as the driving forces 
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behind integration. The authors call the third and latest phase ‘post-Ricardian’, being 
characterized by the Commission-conscious drive for ‘modernization’ and ‘liberalization’ 
towards the Anglo-Saxon model (2007:8). Höpner and Schäfer argue that the Commission is 
strategically promoting the removal of institutions intended to organize economies, as 
institutions are perceived as obstacles to the economic union. Regulatory institutions are hereby 
consecutively separated from the economic units no longer under the control of Member States. 
The rationale behind this strategy is to expand the influence and responsibility at the 
supranational level. In consequence, a clash between national and supranational institutions 
occurs, as the liberalization process lacks the necessary legitimacy (2007:12). In response to a 
paper by Caporaso and Tarrow (Caporaso & Tarrow, 2009), who see signs of a counter 
movement of social embedding by decisions made by the ECJ favoring cross-border social 
transfers, Höpner and Schäfer accentuate their argument: The nature of EU fiscal 
decentralization, moreover, prevents a countermovement towards social re-embedding that might 
be expected as a demand from increasing social insecurity. Stark social inequalities between 
Member States and little scope for redistribution leaves the EU in a trap of Hayekian polity 
design (Höpner & Schäfer, 2012). 
This argument is an extreme version of a general trend in the literature that perceives EU 
integration as a process of 'decoupling' the social dimension from economic integration goals, 
while enhancing economic integration and liberalization (F. W. Scharpf, 2002). From its 
beginning in the aftermath of WWII, economic integration through market creation and 
undistorted competition was at the heart of European integration, while the development of re-
distributive social policies remained a national affair. Member States are restricted in their 
abilities to take individual economic decisions, as these might interfere with the already existing 
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economic union. Increasing economic integration impacts the social dimension, as it restricts the 
available policies to achieve social aims. In light of the theoretical debate on European 
integration, the legal endeavors strengthening the Common European Market have been 
predominantly envisaged from what Scharpf calls the asymmetrical interplay between negative 
and positive integration (F. Scharpf, 1996). Negative integration refers to mechanisms that push 
for market liberalization and a transition of control to supranational institutions, whereas positive 
integration refers to mechanisms subject to intergovernmental policy making processes (F. 
Scharpf, 1996).  
However, this claim is in contrast to studies of rule implementation in the EU. According 
to Moravcsik (Moravcsik, 1998), and later Schimmelfennig (Schimmelfennig, 2013), the 
economic or institutional preferences of a state depend strongly on the existing institutional 
strength of their welfare state (Moravcsik, 1998; Schimmelfennig, 2013). If the welfare state 
institutions in a Member State are stable and strong, domestic economic and institutional interest 
will also influence the state institutional preferences in the implementation process. 
Correspondingly, in the absence of strong opposition from institutions, like social partners, 
Member States will choose the liberalization path using EU law to strengthen the economy.  
Europeanization theorists have argued that the higher the degree of misfit between the existing 
institutional regulatory traditions and the newly imposing European rules, the more problematic 
the adjustment procedures are likely to be (Börzel, 2000; Duina, 1997). Member States are likely 
to be reluctant to implement and delay the process if the EU legal framework does not 
correspond with the national preferences or the national policy framework.  
This paper aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the effects of 
liberalization through European policy-making and the effects on national institutions.  
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According to Caporaso and Tarrow, markets are embedded in social institutions (Caporaso & 
Tarrow, 2009).  According to this line of reasoning, in order to understand the dynamics of 
market liberalization and social embedding as a ‘double movement’, it is necessary to look at the 
adjustment processes of national institutions to the challenge of liberalization.  Market 
liberalization in a context of wide social and economic inequality, as in the enlarged European 
Union, poses major challenges to mature welfare states with highly regulated labor markets.  
Studies have shown, for example, that migration poses fiscal pressures and threats to solidarity 
that can dampen enthusiasm for welfare compensation and spark calls for welfare retrenchment 
(Burgoon, 2012).  However, these studies have focused on migrants that benefit from welfare 
services. In this paper we focus on migrants that relocate because they have found work. 
In contrast to views that see Members States as receivers of liberalization policies which 
they cannot shape, theories of  institutional adjustment assume that Member States have some 
leeway to decide on the extent to which they embrace the market dynamic of liberalization. 
Member States have control over their own adjustment strategies beyond decision procedures at 
the European level. They are not victims of supranational liberalization but active agents, who 
can either reinforce liberalizing mechanisms or counteract them.  A closer look at the ECJ-
rulings in the Viking, Laval and Rückert cases confirms this perspective. In all these cases the 
ECJ did not restrict the general rights of collective action, but clarified that collective action, or 
specifically collectively bargained contracts, have to be determined in such a way that they are 
universally applicable for a whole sector within a country. In cases of regional differences or 
federal deviations, the system is not considered as transparent and, therefore, impedes the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty; the Laval ruling asked for an institutional 
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adjustment that might have posed a “major normative difficulty”(F. W. Scharpf, 2010), but not 
an insurmountable obstacle for defending Swedish welfare institutions.  
In the Rush Portuguesa ruling, the ECJ clearly stated that, “(EU) law does not preclude 
Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labor agreements entered into both 
sides of the industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no 
matter in which country the employer is established nor does (EU) law prohibit Member States 
from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.”1 These rulings clarify the pressure for 
Member States to protect and support industrial relations regimes in line with regulations created 
in the course of EU integration. In the absence of these regulations, legal gaps occur which will 
enforce the process of liberalization.  
Counteracting liberalization includes strategies of labor market re-regulation, legal 
adjustment and redesigning welfare entitlements. Member States also decide about the role and 
influence of the social partners within the implementation process. Social partners are challenged 
by European integration, not because supranational interactions undermine their influence, but 
because supranational decisions unveil the extent to which trade unions have an influential 
legacy within the welfare state or are actively involved in policy making. Polanyi famously 
argued that society has a long tradition of regulating business if market forces get out of hand 
(Polyani, 1944).  Once the free market attempts to separate itself from the fabric of society, 
social protectionism is society's natural response (Ruggie, 1982).  
In order to explore these two theoretical claims we consider the broad expectations that 
follow from each approach.  Summing up, according to the theoretical perspective that EU 
integration develops as a process of deinstitutionalization, social protection schemes in EU 
                                                            
1 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa v Office national d’immigration (1990). 
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member states are bound to be eroded as European market integration enables cost competition 
based on institutional arbitrage. In contrast, a theoretical perspective that views EU integration as 
allowing room for institutional adjustment at the Member State level would expect domestic 
actors to be able to shape social protection in order to embed EU market integration. 
 
II Methodology  
 Case study approach. We adopt a case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
1994) in order to evaluate our two sets of expectations about either deinstitutionalization or 
institutional readjustment. We conducted interviews with key social partners and decision 
makers in the meat industry in both countries, including meat producers, trade unions, politicians 
and civil servants.  We also collected information about actor positions from an extensive web 
search and several published sources including German and Danish newspapers, union 
documents as well as studies and documents published by employer organizations. Rather than 
engage in hypothesis testing (Yin, 1994), we investigate some expectations from the existing 
literature on the ability of governments to shape social protection schemes. 
Country selection.  We focus on Germany and Denmark, which are both highly regulated 
economies2.   However, Germany and Denmark have very different labor market institutions. 
Germany’s industrial relations’ system focuses on the manufacturing sector and has strong 
insider protection (Hassel, 2007). Denmark, on the other hand, has stronger trade union 
involvement but a highly flexible labor market (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007; Thelen & Martin, 
                                                            
2 Coordinated market economies (CMEs) in the language of the Varieties of Capitalism literature 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
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2007).  Germany and Denmark have adopted different approaches to managing the influx of 
cheap labor. 
Industry selection. We examine the treatment of migrant labor in the meat industry to 
explore the dynamics of EU labor market liberalization.  The sector is economically important 
for Germany and Denmark. Germany is the number one meat processor in the EU for pork, with 
58 million animals slaughtered and processed per year, and in second place, behind France, for 
processing cattle3.  The meat industry is an extreme case of EU liberalization resulting in severe 
challenges to the German and Danish labor markets. Is it possible to protect workers in this 
industry against market pressure or not? The industry illustrates the interactions between 
economic restructuring, cheap labor, EU law and national policy making.  The sector is known 
for having bad labor practices, rampant exploitation of migrant workers and fierce cost 
competition. In this industry we find migrant workers from the poorest Member States working 
in Member States with the highest average wages in the EU. Danish wage agreements cover the 
entire industry, while in Germany collectively agreed wages only cover about a third of the non-
subcontracted staff, amounting to less than 10 percent of all workers in the German meat 
industry. The other 90 percent of workers have precarious employment contracts.  If we find 
evidence of national institutional protection within such an industry with such a high degree of 
market pressure due to EU liberalization, we can assume that other industries will also be able to 
protect national standards.  
 
                                                            
3 However, statistics on the evolution of slaughter and dismantling indicate that only pork 
processing has increased during the last decade, whereas poultry and cattle have remained 
comparatively constant. 
 11 
 
 
III Evidence:  Case studies of social protection schemes in the German and Danish meat 
industry 
To what extent has EU market liberalization led to de-institutionalization of social protection 
schemes in the German and Danish meat industry and to what extent have social partners been 
able to undertake institutional adjustment to protect workers? 
 
German migrant workers in the meat industry4 
In Germany EU liberalization has reinforced de-institutionalization processes underway in the 
German employment system in general and in the meat production industry in particular. 
However, the increasingly dire working conditions in the meat industry encouraged by the ability 
to post workers – along with a deterioration of working conditions in the construction sector, the 
care sector and the cleaning sector (REFS) – recently led to the adoption of a minimum wage as 
a way to stem further decline in working conditions.   
 
De-institutionalization 
Prior to the EU Single Market program, structural changes in German meat production 
were beginning to take place that since have underpinned EU liberalization.  Before the 1980s, 
meat processing and slaughtering used to be handled by slaughter troops in Germany. Groups of 
                                                            
4 This section is based on empirical evidence collected in in-depth qualitative interviews with 
representatives from labor, employers and government representatives that were carried out 
during the period October - December 2013. 
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self-employed butchers went from region to region to slaughter the animals. According to 
employers and their organisations, one of the major problems of these slaughter troops was that, 
irrespective of their actual employment relations with the slaughterhouse, they were paid a net 
amount of money as if they were self-employed. Subcontracting was then introduced as an 
initiative to transfer the responsibility from the contractor to the contracting company. The 
former self-employed butchers formed companies and worked as subcontractors. The new wages 
were, however, significantly lower and reduced interest in learning this profession (interview III, 
interview V). As indicated by Piore (Piore, 1979), meat processing underwent a shift from the 
first to the second labor market, decreasing its attractiveness for native workers. Foreign 
workers’ contracts, based on bilateral agreements, started to become the solution for the supply 
gap.  Figure 1 provides an overview of postings by destination countries (from the old EU 15  
member states as well as from the new EU 12 member states in 2011).  As can be seen in Figure 
1, in 2011, Germany had received a total of 311,361 posted workers from other EU countries.  
 
-------------- Figure 1 about here --------- 
 
Data from the German national agency of employment indicates that 143,392 employees 
were registered as working in the slaughter and meat processing industry in 2013, out of which 
21,249 were foreign nationals (see figure 2 for an overview of regular employees in the meat 
processing industry in Germany 2002-2013).  
 
------------- Figure 2 about here ---------- 
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Overall, the number of native workers constantly decreased during the past 15 years, 
whereas the number of regular employees with foreign nationality has increased. However, these 
data do not include posted workers employed via subcontractors. Data on the number of A1 
forms issued for the posting to Germany indicate, moreover, that after construction, meat 
processing is the second biggest sector receiving posted workers in Germany (Wagner & Hassel, 
2014).   Table 1 offer an overview of foreigners as a share of total population across the EU 
member states. 
 
------------- Table 1 about here ----------- 
 
 In 1996 the Posted Workers Directive, in combination with the EU accession rounds of 
2004 and 2007, facilitated the provision of workers from Central and Eastern Europe.  Recent 
media and political interest in labor exploitation and cheap labor in the meat processing industry 
in Germany primarily focuses on posted workers working via subcontracting companies in 
Germany. In response to this public debate, trade unions, employers’ organisations as well as 
national and regional government have started negotiations to discuss initiatives in order to 
stabilize the industry and restore its reputation.   A main reason for the increased use of migrant 
workers in the meat processing industry was the shortage of domestic labor willing to work 
there. The foreign workers’ contracts, supported by the government, were a solution for this lack 
of labor supply (interview III, IV, V). According to the employers’ organisations, the high level 
of skills required made workers from post-communist countries particularly attractive for 
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domestic meat processing companies. At the same time, domestic workers, directed via 
employment agency initiatives, showed little or no interest in the labor intensive work processes. 
In comparison with foreign workers’ contracts, posting has been considered a cheaper and more 
lucrative option, as wage and tax differentials between posting country and receiving country 
ensure a comparatively high wage from a home country perspective and a cheap wage option for 
the receiving country (interview V). 
 Companies and employers’ organisations link the rise of subcontracting to the 
existing service contract law, according to which certain processes have to be outsourced entirely 
to subcontractors in order to prevent violations of the temporary employment act when 
employing foreign workers (interview VI). A company cannot mix posted workers, or temporary 
workers, with fixed employees without violating the law. In consequence, slaughter and 
dismantling has been subdivided into various parts and outsourced to different companies 
(interview III, IV).  
German companies outsource some of the “dismantling” processes to mainly German 
subcontractors. The contract signed with the latter is a service contract, passing the liability for 
the work and the workers employed to the subcontractor. The domestic subcontractor then signs 
a group of subcontracts for the different processes to different, mostly foreign, but also domestic 
companies. Media coverage on the average wages of posted workers as well as regular 
employees of subcontracting firms have claimed that wages vary between € 1.50 and € 8 per 
hour.  Apart from wage level pressures, trade unions claim that the predominant system of 
subcontracting and the posting of workers have negative long-term effects on the German 
industry as a whole (interview II). One of the consequences of the labor market structure in the 
industry has been the rapid drop in apprenticeships within the sector and the intra-company 
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generation of new recruits. Trade unions and employers’ organizations confirm that little 
investment is made into the training and recruitment of apprentices within the German labor 
market, thereby increasing the dependency on subcontracting companies, where little is known 
about intra-company qualifications (interview II, III, VI).  
 
Institutional re-adjustment  
Trade unions have demanded co-determination rights for subcontracting strategies in 
general, as well as the content of the work outsourced to subcontractors (interview II). However, 
due to the weakness of works councils, there is little influence over subcontracting.   Only two of 
the four major meat processing companies have works councils and collective agreements. 
However, works councils don’t have the right to co-decide whether subcontractors are employed 
or not (interview II). According to the trade union responsible for the meat processing sector, 
these contracts hold only for direct employees, ensuring that their wages are approximately 80 
percent higher than those of employees working for subcontractors. At the same time, 
employers’ organisations claim that the meat processing industry in Germany during the past few 
decades has been characterised by a fragmented structure with little or no communication 
between the four major companies. Based on media and government pressure in 2012 and 2013, 
first initiatives for a dialogue between the main companies were successful. However, 
subcontracting companies are not represented and have not shown interest in representation by 
the existing organisation (interview III, VI).  
In August 2013, at the first meeting of the new employers’ organisation in the meat 
processing industry, trade union representatives and government representatives started 
negotiations about the introduction of a minimum wage for the meat processing industry. The 
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negotiations were then interrupted by the national elections, as the introduction of a national 
minimum wage was part of the election programs of the two major parties winning the election. 
In January 2014, an agreement was reached, introducing a sectoral minimum wage as of July 
2014, starting at € 7.75, slightly below the national minimum wage of € 8.50, which will come 
into effect in January 2015. According to our analysis and interviews with unions and policy 
makers, the minimum wage will predominantly ensure wage increases for employees of 
subcontracting companies. Meat processing has also been included into the National Posted 
Workers Act, establishing host country conditions for posted workers in this sector (JSK – I do 
not follow – what is this?). 
One of the challenges for countries with comparatively small trade union density and 
collective bargaining coverage is the growing dualization, based on the fact that mobile workers 
are neither covered by insider-oriented collective contracts, nor in contact with home country 
trade unions or works’ councils. One reason for the lack of organisation and coverage of foreign 
workers is suspicion and hostility between domestic and foreign workers (interview II). 
However, according to trade union representatives, the tendency has changed, due to the 
recognition that the inclusion of foreign and mobile workers is a necessary precondition in order 
to improve working conditions within the sector. Employer’ representatives have welcomed the 
minimum wage negotiations, as the minimum wage is considered to be a mechanism to stop the 
prevalent race to the bottom within the industry. Moreover, the four major companies in 
Germany are planning to use the implementation of the minimum wage as a legal basis for the 
introduction of auditing mechanisms for their subcontractors. If meat processing is included into 
the German posted workers law, auditing mechanisms will be necessary for the general 
contractors to ensure the compliance of their subcontractors, for which they will be legally liable 
 17 
 
(interview V). This auditing initiative is part of a code of conduct which is planned in 
cooperation with trade unions and the federal ministry of labor, on behavioral and control 
obligations for subcontractors on posted workers’ pay, housing and living conditions. Employers 
derive their initiatives from the perspective that the established system of subcontracting and 
posting is lucrative, and has to be kept lucrative, in order to ensure German dominance in meat 
processing (interview V, VI).  
 
Preliminary conclusions from the German case 
The relatively small number of direct permanent employees who are potentially covered by 
collective agreements indicates a weak trade union influence. We see a dualization process being 
reinforced between high wage, permanent insiders on the one hand and low wage, mobile 
working (mostly posted) outsiders on the other.  At the same time, the employers’ representation 
is also weak, because subcontracting companies are not represented. The alleged necessity for 
subcontracting within the industry, combined with international competition, leads us to the 
conclusion that German companies do not have an interest in addressing this ongoing process of 
dualization.  However, the adoption of the minimum wage is a signal that there are limits to how 
far liberalization is allowed to drive the dualization of the German labor market. 
 
The Danish case – social protection at the cost of the viability of employment? 
Denmark offers social protection to all employees in the meat industry but this increasingly 
comes at the cost of the viability of employment as outsourcing to Germany and Poland 
continues.  
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De-institutionalization 
Between 2008-2012 private salaried jobs in Denmark declined by 10.7 percent (Elmer, 2013).  
The meat industry in particular has experienced a particularly steep drop in employment. In 2014 
overall employment in the meat production industry in Denmark was estimated to be about 
40,000. During a 9 month period in 2009 alone, Danish Crown laid off more than 2,500 workers 
(Ansvar, 2009).  In 2012 only two pig slaughterhouses were left in Denmark: Danish Crown 
accounted for about 80 percent of all slaughterhouse jobs in Denmark (worldwide turnover was 
about DKK 52 billion – about € 7 billion), while Tican managed the remaining 20 percent of all 
pigs slaughtered in Denmark (Refslund, 2013).  Recently in January 2014, the largest meat 
producer in Denmark, Danish Crown made a decision to move 472 jobs to Poland and Germany 
in order to take advantage of the lower wages in these two countries (Andersen, 2014).   
 The decline in meat production employment in Denmark is a fairly recent 
development. At the beginning of the new millennium, the slaughterhouses were scrambling to 
attract workers. Denmark had almost full employment and slaughterhouses were not seen as 
particularly attractive places to work and employers found it hard to attract workers. The sector 
had the most workplace accidents of any sector in Denmark (Refslund, 2013), for example, and 
the work is very physically demanding, with a high degree of stress.  Danish Crown won 
substantial fame in Denmark for a couple of years for instituting new programs to attract workers 
with other problems than unemployment. Danish Crown hired workers who had previously been 
on welfare for as long as 15-20 years, workers with substance abuse problems, mental illness or 
workers who were recent immigrants to Denmark (Kirkelund & Kolbech, 2005; Knudsen & 
Brown, 2014). The Danish government subsidized their salary for the first 26 weeks and the 
local employment office provided a social worker to help recent employees make the transition 
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into the working world. Many employees of Danish Crown became involved in supporting the 
new workers, and teams would dedicate themselves to picking up new employees in the morning 
and drive them to work in order to help them make the transition from social welfare to regular 
work. The programs were successful, and most new recruits stayed with Danish Crown on 
regular contractual terms after the initial 26 week state subsidy ended (Kirkelund & Kolbech, 
2005).   
However, in the last decade or so employers have outsourced production to Germany and 
Poland where wages are much lower.  Table 2 provides an overview of the hourly wages in 
Danish slaughterhouses and the number of workers employed there from 1997 – 2012. 
 
------------- Table 2 about here ---------------- 
 
In contrast to Germany, labor migration and subcontracting have not played a role in 
Danish slaughterhouses because of the structure of industrial relations in Denmark. The 
slaughterhouse workers’ union has traditionally organized nearly 100 percent of all 
slaughterhouse workers and this is still the case today. This meant that slaughterhouse workers 
have had favorable position vis-à-vis employers if they threatened to strike, since there were no 
non-union factory alternatives to slaughtering animals in Denmark. 
 
Industrial readjustment through industrial relations  
Most Danish workers belong to unions and are covered by collective bargaining agreements 
reached through corporatist institutions. However, there is no minimum wage set by law and 
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collective agreements are not generally applicable.  For a worker, the only way to be covered by 
a collective agreement, and thereby be entitled to a minimum wage, is to join a company that has 
signed a collective agreement.   The union for meat production workers (Nærings- og 
Nydelsesmiddelforbundet, NNF) demands that all workers in Denmark receive the union-agreed 
wage (interview VII). If an employer in Denmark were to pay less than the agreed union wage, 
the union would organize a strike, which would likely force the employer in line, given that 
practically all slaughterhouse workers in Denmark are members of the union. The high 
organization rate for workers has traditionally been a core union strength but the option to move 
production to cheaper locations within the EU is fast eroding the union’s traditional power.  The 
NNF also works proactively to prevent social dumping (interview VII). In recent years, for 
example, the NNF has sought to organize Polish colleagues working in Denmark. NNF has hired 
a “bro-bygger” (“go-between”), Jurek Okipny, from Poland who has worked to make sure that 
Polish employees in Denmark join local NNF union chapters. This attempt has been a major 
success. Polish members of the NNF have stayed organized, and more workers have joined up. 
In addition, one of the new union representatives (tillidsrepræsentant) of the NNF is Polish.5  
The employers’ association (Slagteriernes Arbejdsgiverforening a member of DI) has 
long since asked that wages in Denmark be reduced. The employers’ association argues that if 
workers will not agree to a wage reduction then employers will have no choice but to outsource 
production (Stilling, 2010).6 The employers’ association believes that high wages are causing the 
deterioration of Danish competitiveness and that lowering wages and adjusting taxes is the way 
                                                            
5 “Fødevarearbejdere til kongres Pres på Danish Crown”, Arbejderen, 27.09.2012: 2. 
6 See Irene Stilling, “Slagteriforhandlinger brudt sammen”, avisen.dk, 17 March 2010. 
Slagteriernes arbejdsgiverforening. 
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forward.7  Both the leading Liberal Party (Venstre) and the Social Democratic Party have 
supported the creation of a foundation, financed through a wage reduction and employer funding. 
In 2013, the Minister for Industry, Henrik Sass Larsen (a Social Democrat), supported the 
proposal for a wage cut to finance an increased production of pigs (the union rep had endorsed 
the proposal). This position was also shared by former Minister for Employment, Claus Hjort 
Frederiksen, (Politiken, 2013).  Furthermore, Danish politicians also support the creation of a 
minimum wage in Germany as a way to level the competitive playing field. Thus, when the 
member of the Liberal Party (Venstre), Mr Claus Hjort Frederiksen, was Minister for 
Employment in 2005, he argued that slaughterhouses in Germany should pay a minimum wage. 
“It is not right to just put some Polish workers in a bus and transport them to Germany for work. 
It is not fair competition to use Polish “kolonnearbejdere” (“slaughter troops”) in Germany.”8 
 Facing a high degree of job loss, the NNF has openly supported lowering taxes for the 
food industry as a way of reducing production costs.  The NNF maintains that it is important to 
focus on fighting social dumping rather than focus on adjusting (= lowering) the Danish wages 
for slaughterhouse workers9.  NNF suggests that adjusting the taxes imposed on the food 
industry would be a better solution than lowering Danish wages.  The Danish Department of 
Food and Resource Economics (Fødevareøkonomisk Institut) has published a couple of reports 
that conclude that taxes – not wages – constitute a major problem for the struggling Danish 
agriculture and food production.10 The Danish workers’ main umbrella association (LO) also 
                                                            
7 See e.g. http://publikationer.di.dk/di/926376461/. 
8 Tysk politi: Danish Crown bruger ulovlige polakker Vejle Amts Folkeblad | 22.06.2005. 
9 NNF http://www.nnf.dk/nyheder/2013/februar/hold-fokus-paa-social-dumping-ikke-loen!/ 
10 http://www.nnf.dk/nyheder/2012/januar/overdrevet-fokus-paa-de-danske-loenninger!/ and 
http://www.nnf.dk/nyheder/2013/januar/erstat-loennedgang-med-afgiftsstop/. 
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supports the solution of reducing taxes.11 NNF’s vice president, Jens Peter Bostrup, explains how 
the NNF sees social dumping in the slaughterhouse industry (own translation): “social dumping 
leads to a downward spiral in which jobs move to where employers pay the least possible. And 
then they disregard the effect on the employees. It is a race to the bottom, which only the EU can 
stop”. 
However, in the fall of 2013, the union, together with the employers’ association, began 
to consider new approaches for improving productivity levels in Danish slaughterhouses 
(interview VII). The union proposed a wage cut of 6.4 percent (about DKK 25,000 before 
tax/year). The money saved on wages would be set aside in order to help establish a foundation 
that would finance the slaughtering of three million more pigs for the next four years. The 
intention was that those additional pigs would be slaughtered at the Danish Crown plant in 
Horsens in Denmark. Farmers would also invest in the foundation and thus both the union and 
the employers would finance productivity gains (Danish Crown is a cooperative owned by 
farmers). The NNF and union representatives supported the initiative.12 However, the union 
members voted no to the proposal. 60 percent of the workers refused to accept a wage cut, and 
the proposal was subsequently dismissed.  Danish Crown announced in the spring 2014 that the 
site on Bornholm would be closed unless production costs were reduced. Bornholm is a small 
island and therefore offers very limited alternative employment.  The case quickly received 
major media attention. Management proposed that workers should accept to transfer 8 percent of 
their wages to an investment fund that would be used to introduce new technology and save jobs 
at the site.  According to the proposal, there would be no return on investment. The local 
                                                            
11 http://www.nnf.dk/nyheder/2012/september/kongres-lo-stoette-til-kamp-mod-afgifter-og-
social-dumping/ 
12 Front page “I Tyskland slagtes danske svin for den halve timeløn”, Politiken | 18.09.2013. 
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government was committed to reducing production costs on utilities like water and electricity to 
sweeten the deal and save employment on the island. However, employees turned down the 
proposal because it contained no job guarantees and there was no return on investment.  
Disappointed with the outcome the Minister of Growth and Trade, Henrik Sass Larsen engaged 
in negotiations with NNF and DI (the Confederation of Danish Industry) to reach a solution. An 
agreement between NFF and DI was finally presented on June 3, 2014 consisting of the 
following key elements:  1) The agreement to save the site required a cut in production costs of 
25 million DKK per year;  2) Management would commit to investing  in new technology;  3) 
The agreement included the establishment of an Employee Investment Company (EIC) to 
provide funding for investments.  The EIC is a new legal construction that receives tax 
exemptions for investments and makes it possible for workers to get a return on their investment.  
Investments can be between 5-10 percent of workers’ income, with a cap of 35, 000 DKK/year. 
The investment should run at least three years and was intended to provide social partners with 
an alternative to pure wage reductions. Worker contributions are equivalent to 3.5 per cent of 
gross earnings and can come from the so called Free-Choice account (fritvalgskontoen) in the 
collective agreement which can be used for extra paid vacation, pension or wages. As such, 
workers are free to choose where they want the contributions to come from.  Workers will get 
some money back once the goal of 25 million DKK in cost reductions per year has been reach – 
but no earlier than in 2017; 4).  In addition to this agreement, the central government set aside 
1.3 million DKK to be invested in the site. The agreement was subsequently supported by a 90 
percent employee majority..  
 
Preliminary conclusions from the Danish case 
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Even a strong and all-encompassing union, such as the NNF, cannot prevent the 
outsourcing of production. For the (few) remaining meat production workers in Denmark, wages 
and working conditions have remained attractive, in contrast to the situation for workers in 
Germany. However, the preservation of the Danish industrial relations system has come at a high 
cost as more than half the workers in the Danish slaughterhouses have lost their jobs.  NNF has 
accepted real wage decline through the collective bargaining system. Moreover, the EIC 
agreement, which includes employee financial participation, constitutes a new approach for trade 
unions trying to save jobs. The fact that a Social Democratic government has endorsed the EIC 
could mean that more companies in other industries might also ask employees to finance 
investments.  
 
IV  Discussion and conclusion 
 Denmark’s response to EU liberalization is to provide continued high levels of equality 
for all workers in the industry.  However, Danish wages are more than three times as high as the 
German minimum wage. Equality in Denmark therefore comes at a high cost, as the meat 
production industry has lost most of its jobs, and despite attempts to make the industry more 
competitive the difference between the new German minimum wage and the high wages in 
Denmark is so significant that Danish producers are not likely to be able to compete if they 
maintain production in Denmark. In Germany, collective wage agreements in the meat 
production industry cover only 10 percent of the workers.  Hence the collective agreements only 
apply to a small subset of the meat production workers.  As Thelen (Thelen, 2014) has argued, in 
Germany industrial relations are characterized by dualization, which involves a zero-sum choice 
between defending the interests of labor market insiders or taking up the cause of labor market 
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outsiders. The German unions have chosen the first strategy.  German labor market institutions 
are very conducive for job creation but at the cost of social protection.  In the EU social 
protection is the responsibility of the host country. The German case illustrates that host country 
protection is contingent on domestic labor market institutions.  If labor market institutions are 
weak, then social protection is also weak. 
The meat production industry is an extreme example of intense cost competition and 
difficult working conditions.  The Danish industry model was based on high wages and standards 
for all employees in the meat industry. A labor shortage was met by social initiatives to improve 
the supply of workers from within Denmark through social inclusion initiatives. The German 
industry model rested on a very different tradition. Groups of independent slaughterers moved 
from one small slaughterhouse to the next, which were usually run by local communities. When 
the industry was restructured, and private businesses moved in to replace the community-owned 
cooperatives, employers soon faced a labor shortage. Rather than upgrading work and pay, 
employers brought in contract workers from Eastern Europe, who as early as the 1980s were 
allowed to enter Germany following the signing of bilateral government agreements (JSK – does 
this info come about too abruptly?). When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, these contracts continued 
for some time until the EU accession of Eastern Europe, combined with the adoption of the 
Posted Workers Directive, enabled a new pattern of labor migration. It is based on subcontractors 
in the new EU Member States who facilitate the posting of workers to German slaughterhouses. 
Subcontractors compete for contracts in slaughtering and are not bound by collective agreements 
in the meat industry or by the going industry rate. They also do not have to pay social security 
contributions, which in Germany amount to 40 percent of the gross wage. Therefore 
subcontractors have considerably lower labor costs compared to German employees.  
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The stark differences in wages and labor costs between Germany and Denmark put 
pressure on the Danish meat industry, which has triggered two responses. Firstly, big Danish 
meat producers, such as Danish Crown, relocated slaughtering to Germany. Secondly, a 
discussion emerged in Denmark about wage cuts. While the Danish union has generally been 
able to protect wages from major cuts, half the jobs in the meat industry were lost. In 2014, the 
union agreed to cut wages in return for Danish Crown agreeing to continuing production in its 
slaughterhouse facilities on the island of Bornholm.   
Through relocation and concentration, Germany has now established itself as a major 
meat producer in the EU. Ironically, the opening of the Eastern European market, where meat 
production was primarily located in Hungary and Poland, did not lead to the outsourcing of 
German meat production to Eastern Europe. Instead, German business was able to combine its 
high technological standards and experience of the industry with a business model that relies on 
cheap labor from Eastern Europe. The Posted Workers Directive has facilitated an employment 
regime, which allows for different wage and employment tiers within the same production 
facility in a high-wage country. Posted workers who work for Eastern European subcontractors 
have minimal contact with German employment conditions: they pay no taxes or social 
insurance in Germany, nor are they part of the German co-determination systems. Even though 
they can be posted for several years to the same slaughterhouse, they are not part of the German 
employment regime.  
The strength of Danish trade unions prevented Danish firms from establishing a similar 
regime, although social protection came at the expense of major job losses, and these jobs are not 
likely to return to Denmark again.  Can we say that the Danish model of social protection is a 
success if most jobs in meat production are ultimately lost? Certainly the insiders benefit. We 
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can also see that unemployment is low in Denmark at around 5 percent (www.dst.dk). The re-
employment rate of fired meat production workers in other industries is high. For example, 
Danish Crown laid off 632 workers in 2012 and two years later 95 percent of the workers had 
found a new job, retraining for a new profession or had entered into retirement.13 We were able 
to obtain data about reemployment from NNF. NNF graciously provided data from five Danish 
Crown plant closings including Danish Crown Esbjerg (closed in August 2012); Danish Crown 
Fårvang (closed in January 2014), Danish Crown Holstebro – Cows (closed in March 2012);  
Danish Crown Holstebro – Pigs (closed in 2009) and Danish Crown Skjern (closed in June 
2014).  The closing of a Danish Crown production facility takes place in a step-wise fashion and 
hence workers have some time to adjust and to look for other work, enter an education program, 
plan for retirement, etc. NNF provided data for the number of 1,675 workers who were employed 
in these five plants on January 2009 (Fårvang), January 2012 (Holstebro – Cows) and January 
2014 (Esbjerg, Holstebro – Pigs and Skjern) and then offered information of their subsequent 
career choice as of 18 December, 2014.  The majority (36%) had found new employment outside 
the broader food industry while 35% had found employment elsewhere in the food industry 
working for example for Danish Crown in its new facility in Holsted or in dairy giant Arla. 14% 
were pursuing a career path including entering an education program and 9 % had entered 
retirement (including early retirement). Only 6% of the dismissed workers remained 
unemployed.  Table 3 illustrates the career paths of the 1,675 dismissed Danish Crown workers. 
 
----------- Table 3 about here ---------- 
 
                                                            
13 http://arbejderen.dk/fagligt/fyrede-slagteriarbejdere-har-fået-job. 
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In contrast German trade unions were not in a position to stop slaughterhouses from 
outsourcing their jobs to subcontractors. Access to skilled workers from Eastern Europe gave 
slaughterhouses a cheaper alternative to making jobs more attractive.  Table 4 provides an 
overview of elements of deinstitutionalization as well as of institutional readjustment in the 
German and Danish labor market models. 
 
------------ Table 4 about here  --------------- 
 
 The restructuring of the European meat industry can be seen as a prime example of how a 
European market, combined with the opportunity to post workers, enables cost competition, 
based on institutional arbitrage. Subcontractors from Eastern Europe have major cost advantages 
due to a) lower wages, because Eastern European workers compare their wages to those in their 
home countries, b) lower indirect labor costs, as social insurance in Germany is very high and c) 
labor flexibility, as Eastern European workers have no opportunity for collective action or 
representation. Abusive practices of posted workers are common and have triggered the adoption 
of an enforcement directive by the EU’s Council of Ministers (EU Commission 2014 
2014/67/EU). Most importantly, the enforcement directive makes key standards of host countries 
mandatory for posted workers and a provision on general liability for subcontractors. However, 
the proposed changes may fall short from changing abusive practices, as these practices entail 
many advantages for businesses and countries alike. Cost competition through posted workers 
and large welfare disparities between European Member States put welfare states under 
substantial pressure: It is important to remember that it is not just Danish jobs that have been 
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relocated to Germany. French and Belgian jobs are also moving to Germany. 14 The Danish case 
provides a role model for firms regarding how to exploit the pool of migrant labor from Eastern 
Europe. Often the relocation to Germany from Denmark, France and Belgium takes place in the 
form of subcontracting.  Migrant workers who are engaged in subcontracting can be employed in 
almost all industries, and this approach is also being used in the care industry (in particular in 
care for the elderly), hotel and restaurants (cleaning) and the construction industry.  
Institutional arbitrage is facilitated by the use of subcontracting and the lack of 
enforcement of national labor standards within Member States. The example of Denmark shows 
that these mechanisms are institutionally defined and that the increasing use of subcontracting 
can be avoided. It is, however, increasingly difficult to avoid as long as the cost incentive for 
companies for using subcontracting remains high.  
As the comparison of Denmark and Germany shows, the regulation of the scope of 
institutional arbitrage within the EU, and the conditions under which it takes place, is under the 
control of the Member States. While liberalizing EU initiatives, such as the Posted Workers 
Directive, have introduced tools for cost competition, Member States can choose whether they 
exploit them or not. Denmark has an institutional context of high levels of solidarity and has only 
liberalized its welfare system at the fringes, while Germany has moved much more towards 
dualization (Hassel, 2014; Thelen, 2014). Our analysis implies that these different institutional 
configurations attract different kinds of production models: low cost slaughtering has found an 
institutional niche in the German institutions that allow for large pools of labor market outsiders 
and migrant workers, whereas Denmark is likely to lose this economic activity.   
                                                            
14 BBC News: Belgium protests over German low pay in EU complaint. By Laurence Peter BBC News. 
9 April 2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22080862. 
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More importantly however, the analysis of the regulation of migrant workers in the meat 
industry in Germany and Denmark shows that, even in the context of EU liberalization, national 
regulations and institutions trump supranational liberalization. Danish and German social 
partners and governments must decide jointly how to employ migrant workers in their industries. 
The German government, if it decided to do so, could improve the oversight of subcontracting, 
limit its use and facilitate the level of corporate restructuring supervision through works councils 
and trade unions. That the German government decided to turn a blind eye to the conditions of 
posted workers is not the fault of supranational liberalization but a strategic decision to position 
itself as a major meat producer within the EU. Rather than a clash of capitalism, this describes a 
process of economic and institutional specialization in a wider economic space. European 
economic integration fosters competition between national institutional systems. The result is 
specialization, not convergence, towards a liberal model. Member States use their national 
institutions to improve comparative advantages. In that sense, the political economy of the EU 
shows rich national variation on how to embrace liberalization policies from the EU.  
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 Interview List 
Interview I – Management Danish Crown 
Interview II – Trade union representative Lower Saxony 
Interview III – Employers’ organization representative Lower Saxony 
Interview IV – Ministry of Labour Lower Saxony 
Interview V – Vion AG Management 
Interview VI – National Employers’ organization Germany 
Interview VII – Danish slaughterhouse workers union (Nærings- og Nydelsesforbundet) 
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portable documents issued in 2010 and 2011, p. 12. Based on administrative data from EU Member States. 
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Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Beschäftigungsstatistik: Sozialversicherungspflichtig 
Beschäftigte nach Wirtschaftszweigen. 
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Table 1: Foreigners as share of total population 
 
total EU Third State nationals 
EU 6,6 2,5 4,1 
Belgium 10,6 6,8 3,8 
Bulgaria 0,5 0,1 0,4 
Czech 
Republic 4 1,3 2,7 
Denmark 6,2 2,3 3,9 
Germany 8,8 3,2 5,6 
Estonia 15,7 1 14,7 
Ireland 8,1 6,5 1,6 
Greece 8,5 1,4 7,1 
Spain 12,3 5 7,3 
France 5,9 2,1 3,8 
Italy 7,5 2,2 5,3 
Cyprus 20 12,5 7,5 
Latvia 17 0,4 16,6 
Lithuania 1 0,1 0,9 
Luxembourg 43,1 37,2 5,9 
Hungary 2,1 1,3 0,8 
Malta 4,9 2,5 2,4 
Netherlands 4 2 2 
Austria 10,8 4,2 6,6 
Poland 0,1 0 0,1 
Portugal 4,2 1 3,2 
Slovenia 4 0,3 3,7 
Slovakia 1,3 0,8 0,5 
Finland 3,1 1,1 2 
Sweden 6,6 2,9 3,7 
UK 7,2 3,3 3,9 
 
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Total_ 
population_and_resident_population_by_group_of_citizenship,_2011-
de.png&filetimestamp=20130722102003. 
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Table 2. Overview of hourly wages and employment in Danish slaughterhouses 1997-2012 
 
Source: Landbrug & Fødevarer 
https://www.lf.dk/Tal_og_Analyser/Aarstatistikker/Statistik_svin/Tidligeres_statistikker.aspx. 
 
Year Hourly wage DKK Employment 
1997 168 14,300 
1998 177 14,200 
1999 182 14,400 
2000 188 13,700 
2001 197 13.900 
2002 205 14,300 
2003 213 13.900 
2004 217 13,000 
2005 223 12,000 
2006 227 10,900 
2007 240 10,700 
2008 251 10,000 
2009 255 8,600 
2010 256 7,800 
2011 258 7,510 
2012 259 7,053 
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Table 3 Dismissed Danish Crown workers (1,675) and their subsequent career paths 
Category of activity Total number of workers Percentage 
New employment in food sector 
(remain in NNF union) 
583 35 
New employment (not in the 
meat industry) 
603 36 
Other (including education) 232 14 
Retirement (including early 
retirement) 
158 9 
Unemployed 93 6 
Other  6 0 
Total 1675 100 
 
 39 
 
Table 4.  Elements of deinstitutionalization and readjustment in Germany and Denmark 
 
 
 Elements of de-
institutionalization 
Elements of institutional 
readjustment 
Germany Labor supply shortage solved 
through posted workers  
Protection of labor market 
insiders only 
Adoption of minimum wage 
Denmark Outsourcing to Germany to take 
advantage of posted workers and 
their low wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bornholm model (wage 
reduction) 
Labor supply shortage solved 
through social inclusion 
 
Social partnerships ensured 
100% coverage 
 
Flexicurity facilitates 
reemployment 
 
Bornholm model (institutional 
adjustment) 
 
 
